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International development is in a period of transition. While the outcome of this is as yet 
unclear, this article argues that there are at least four areas in which the project of 
international development is changing. First, there is a debate, especially within the World 
Bank, about development strategy, particularly in terms of the balance between states and 
markets. Second, and partly following from this, there is increasing evidence of a shift in 
lending, particularly towards infrastructure. Third, ‘non-traditional’ aid donors and new 
forms of private philanthropy are playing a more significant role and in turn this offers 
developing countries a new range of choices about what kinds of development assistance 
they receive. Fourth, partly as a result of this, aid relations are changing as a result of the 
renewed agency of developing states, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and shifts towards 
increased South-to-South co-operation are growing as evidenced by increased funding 
from regional development banks and increased trade flows. The article reviews these 
changes and suggests a series of questions and challenges that flow from them for analysts 
of international development, developing countries and traditional aid donors. 
 




The project of international development is in a period of transition. 1  The various 
dimensions of this transition are relatively clear, even if the outcome is much less so. The 
first aim of this article is to outline and suggest some explanations for what we take to be 
the main dimensions of this transition. These are changes in development thinking, 
particularly with regard to the role of the state; changing donor priorities around ‘big’ and 
‘small’ development; the changing donor landscape and a new age of choice for developing 
countries; and changing aid relationships that creates greater autonomy for developing 
countries. We suggest that such changes are linked together in ways that are leading to 
some quite substantial shifts in the policies and practices of international development. 
The second aim of this article is to signal some of the important questions and debates 
that arise when we take notice of these shifts. First, there are explanatory questions related 
to how we capture the dynamics involved in these areas of change and their relations with 
one another. Second, there are questions about what the new demands will be for 
developing country governments and aid donors in this new environment. Third, and 
related, there are questions about what lessons we might draw from past experiences, in 
the sense that for some of the ideas and practices we see assuming a new significance in 
the contemporary period, there are at least parallels in the past. Finally, there are questions 
about the future trajectory of this transition, where we are transiting to, and whether it will 
be sustained and amplified in the future. 
 
Changes in International Development  
 
There is a sense in which the project of international development is always changing. 
Development agencies are always producing new reports, developing new lending 
programmes and certainly over the last twenty years or so, they have dramatically expanded 
the scope of their work into new areas. Our concern here is not with this kind of change, 
important though it is. It is rather with what we might call more fundamental changes in 
how the process of development is understood, in how foreign aid is contributes to 
development, and in the forms of the relationship between development agencies and 
recipient states. Viewed in this way we think it is possible to identify four related elements 
that suggest there is something significant happening within international development. 
First, a shift in developing thinking that raises important questions about the utility of 
                                                        
1  We very are grateful to Clive Gabay, Ray Kiely, Christopher May, James Scott and two 
anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments and suggestions. 
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market-based policy prescriptions and re-emphasises the role of the state in the 
development process. Second, a return to ‘big’ development, especially in terms of a 
renewed stress on infrastructure and a move away from ‘small’ development as embodied 
in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Third, a set of changes in the donor 
environment that has created a new era of choice for aid recipient states based on pluralism 
and autonomy. Fourth, and related to all of these, a shift in the relationship between 
traditional development agencies and aid recipient states that reinforces this autonomy. In 
all of these areas there are complications and ambiguities, but we think that taken together 
they indicate some possibly very significance changes in the project of international 
development. 
 
Changing development thinking: states and markets 
 
In recent years there has emerged a substantial debate about the relative role of states and 
markets in the development process. This debate has been taking place particularly within 
the World Bank, and given that the Bank has always played a lead role in shaping 
development thinking in the wider development community this is obviously significant.2 
One element of this has been a series of reflections on the developmental record of the 
last 15 years or so. Some of the conclusions of this represent a fundamental critique of the 
development policy that dominated most western development agencies in the 1990s and 
into the first part of the 2000s. As early as 2005 the World Bank was arguing that ‘growth 
entails more than the efficient use of resources. Growth entails structural transformation.’3 
Structural transformation here refers to more than just changes in economic policy or 
                                                        
2 See for example Michael Gavin and Dani Rodrik, ‘The World Bank in Historical Perspective,’ 
American Economic Review, Paper and Proceedings May, 1995, pp. 329-334 and Nicholas Stern and 
Francisco Ferreira, ‘The World Bank as “intellectual Actor”,’ in Devesh Kapur et al, eds, The 
World Bank: its first half century (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), pp. 523-609. 
3 World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s, (Washington: World Bank, 2005), p10. The term 
‘structural transformation’ is something of a new buzzword, although it is clear that there are 
differences in how this term is understood. The World Bank held a conference in 2011 under the 
title ‘Structural Transformation and Economic Growth’. In October 2013 ODI and the DfID-
ESRC Growth Research Programme held a conference under the title ‘Structural 
Transformation, Growth and Development in Low Income Countries’. See also Justin Yifu Lin, 
‘From Flying Geese to Leading Dragons: new Opportunities and Strategies for Structural 
Transformation in Developing Countries’, World Bank Policy Reseat Working Paper, no. 5702, 
Washington, DC, World Bank, June 2011 and Berthold Herrendorf, Richard Rogerson and Akos 
Valentinyi, ‘Growth and Structural Transformation’, in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf 
(eds), The Handbook of Economic Growth vol. 2B (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2014) pp. 855-942. 
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political institutions.4 It is a dynamic process that involves wholesale changes in social 
relations and patterns of production and consumption. This understanding of 
development already signals some kind of return to the ideas associated with the 
development economics of the 1950s.5 More important than this is what the report says 
about how such development is to be achieved: ‘what matters for growth is less the degree 
to which policies approximate the ideal than the extent to which a given development 
strategy is able to mobilize the creative forces of society and achieve ever higher levels of 
productivity.’6 In a profound criticism of market based development policy, the report 
says: 
 
In retrospect it is clear that in the 1990s we often mistook efficiency gains for growth. 
The ‘one-size fits all’ policy reform approach and the belief in ‘best practices’ 
exaggerated the gains from improved resource allocation and … proved to be both 
theoretically incomplete and contradicted by the evidence.7  
 
In some ways the World Bank here was catching up with the wider debate about 
neoliberalism and structural adjustment. 8  While the literature here is extensive and 
diverse, it does seem to justify several conclusions. First, that the kinds of policies 
associated with structural adjustment are better at restoring macro-economic stability to 
crisis-ridden states than stimulating long-term growth. Second, better performing 
developing states often used ‘unorthodox’ economic policies. Third, that the Bank and 
the IMF were not sufficiently attuned to the particular circumstances of individual 
developing countries. In addition, of course, institutions such as UNCTAD consistently 
and continuously challenged the dominance of market-based policy prescriptions 
produced by the Bank.9  
                                                        
4 David Williams, The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics: liberalism, governance 
and sovereignty (London: Routledge, 2008), p86. 
5 See Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development , (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1958). This classic book is quoted in the report. 
6 World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s, p. 11. 
7 World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s, p. 11. 
8 For example see William Easterley, ‘What did Structural Adjustment adjust? the association of 
policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loads,’ Journal of Development 
Economics, 76: 1, 2001, pp. 1-22 . 
9 See, for example, UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2001: performance, prospects and 
policy issues (New York: UNCTAD, 2001). In another sign of the growing importance of 
‘structural transformation’ see UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2012: structural 
transformation and sustainable development in Africa (New York: UNCTAD, 2012). 
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The criticisms made about the effectiveness of markets as a basis for development policy 
obviously raises questions about what kinds of policy prescriptions might be more 
appropriate. The report quoted above made a number of more positive arguments. First, 
an argument for the desirability of policy flexibility: in other words countries should have 
space to adapt and adopt policies that seem best suited to their particular circumstances. 
Second, the report argued that there were some ‘essential’ functions’ that characterize all 
successful developing countries, but that these functions - rapid accumulation of capital, 
efficient resource allocation, technological progress, and sharing the benefits of growth - 
could be achieved by varied and various policies. Third, it argued that government 
discretion should be managed, not replaced by rules, and that there should be a pragmatic 
and incremental approach to public sector governance.10  
 
The role of the state in the economy and in the process of development more generally is 
central to these new concerns and this issue has been debated extensively within the Bank. 
We can identify two strands here. The first strand understands the issue to be one of the 
appropriate balance between considerations of ‘market failure’ and ‘state failure.’11 This 
has been one of the longest standing debates within development economics. In the post-
war period much more stress was placed on market failures within developing countries 
and hence the need for a more interventionist state. The 1980s counter-revolution in turn 
placed more emphasis on state failures, and hence stressed the desirability of relying on 
the market mechanism for allocating economic resources.12 There is no doubt that, in the 
words of Devarajan and Kanbur ‘the pendulum has swung back in the direction of the 
statist dominance of the 1940s and 1950s.’13 This way of understanding the problem is 
largely a technical one in the sense that it invites detailed consideration of the forms of 
market and state failure in individual developing countries and attempts to devise policies 
to overcoming these. This way of understanding the issue of the role of the state is related 
to, but also rather different from that articulated by the former World Bank Chief 
Economist Justin Lin. In his book, New Structural Economics, Lin sought to address the 
shortcomings of previous development policies that, according to Lin, have not delivered 
                                                        
10 World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s, passim. 
11 Shantayanan Devarajan and Ravi Kanbur, ‘The Evolution of Development Strategy as 
balancing market and government failure’ Charles H Dyson School of Applied Economics and 
Management, Cornell University, Working Paper 09, 2013. 
12 John Toye, Dilemmas of Development (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 
13 Devarajan and Kanbur, ‘The Evolution of Development Strategy,’ p. 4. 
 6 
on growth or provided effective policy guidance for developing countries.14 The approach 
he articulated sought to go beyond neoclassical structural and neoliberal approaches to 
development economics to recognise that while the market is fundamental to resource 
allocation, innovation, and industrial diversity, the government also needs to play a 
significant role.15 For Lin the issue is not simply that of the appropriate balance between 
state failure and market failure, but more broadly the role or responsibility of the state in 
consciously driving and shaping the process of structural change. One way of thinking 
about this is to take note of how the experience of different regions has shaped the debate. 
Devarajan is World Bank Chief Economist for the Africa region (and for Kanbur too 
Africa has been central) and reflecting on the development experience of that region 
demonstrates the profound consequences of ‘state failure’ and generates perhaps more 
caution in advocating a return to statist development (something we reflect on below). Lin 
on the other hand has spent considerable time reflecting on the development experience 
of East Asian states where the issue was not just the extent of government intervention 
(to correct market failures) but the more fundamental one that the state led and directed 
the process of development as part of a national economic and political project. 
 
Some of these arguments have been around before, particularly in the context of 
reflections on the development success of the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies. It is 
particularly striking though how the World Bank is debating a different way of 
understanding these economies than it was prepared to countenance in the mid-1990s, 
when it emphasised export promotion and macro-economic management as key factors.16 
These arguments have also been put forward by a number of other economists. Dani 
Rodrik, for example, has argued that neoliberal reforms ‘were too obsessed with 
deadweight-loss triangles and reaping efficiency gains from eliminating them, and did not 
pay enough attention to stimulating the dynamic forces that lie behind the growth process. 
Seeking efficiency gains does not amount to a growth strategy.’17 What had previously been marginal 
                                                        
14  Justin Yifu Lin, ‘New structural economics: a framework for rethinking development’ World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5197, 2010; Justin Yifu Lin and David Rosenblatt, ‘Shifting 
patterns of economic growth and rethinking development,’ World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, No. 6040, 2012.  
15 Lin, ‘New Structural Economics.’ 
16 World Bank, World Development Report: infrastructure for development, (Washington: World Bank, 
1994); Robert Wade, ‘Japan, The World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: the East 
Asian Miracle in political perspective, ’ New Left Review, 217:May/June ,1996, pp. 3-36. 
17 Dani Rodrik, ‘Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? a review of 
The World Bank’s Economic growth in the 1990s: Learning from a decade of reform,’ Journal of Economic 
Literature XLIV, 2006, p. 975, emphasis in original. 
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views have been drawn into the World Bank, sometimes in quite concrete ways – Rodrik, 
for example, has talked at the Bank, written papers, and contributed to Bank blogs.18 The 
Commission on Growth and Development report of 2008 also demonstrated a renewed 
commitment to the state: ‘just because governments are sometimes clumsy and sometimes 
errant, does not mean they should be written out of the script. On the contrary, as the 
economy grows and develops, active, pragmatic governments have crucial roles to play.’19 
We can see some evidence of the impact of these kinds of arguments in the ‘revival’ of 
five-year national development strategies and economic planning in a number of 
countries.20 
 
Reflection on market-based policy prescriptions and the associated debate about the role 
of the state has been shaped of course by changes in the broader international 
environment. The examples of China in particular, but also Brazil (and others) have amply 
demonstrated that successful development (by some measures at least) can be achieved 
using a mix of polices quite different from those embodied in the Washington Consensus.21 
Indeed, it has been argued that almost all ‘successful’ developing countries have used 
‘unorthodox’ policies.22 These examples show the centrality of the state not just in directing 
specific investment spending or intervening in specific markets, but more generally leading 
the process of development through the formulation and implementation of a 
development strategy. The financial and economic crisis has also called into question some 
of the underlying assumptions and arguments about the utility of the ‘market’ and also led 
to debates about the use of unorthodox policies such as capital controls, even within the 
IMF.23 In addition, many developing countries have experienced much better economic 
performance than Europe or the US since the crisis. In this environment, the self-
                                                        
18 His arguments are collected in Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: globalization, institutions 
and growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
19  Commission on Growth and Development, Growth Report: strategies for sustain growth and inclusive 
development (Washington DC: World Bank, 2008), p. 4. 
20 Sam Hickey, ‘Beyond ‘Poverty Reduction through Good Governance’: the new political 
economy of development in Africa,’ New Political Economy, 17:5, 2013, pp. 683-690; Martin Khor, 
‘Reviving economic planning in Africa’ Third World Network, 
http://twnside.org.sg/title2/gtrends/gtrends417.html (accessed May 2013). 
21 Dani Rodrik, ‘Trading in Illusions,’ Foreign Policy , 123: March-April, 2001, pp. 54-62. 
22 Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, ‘How to Help Poor Countries,’ Foreign 
Affairs, 84:4, 2005, pp.136-152. 
23  Jonathan D. Ostry, et al., Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls (Washington DC: IMF, 2010); IMF, 
The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional View, (Washington DC: IMF, 
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/111412.pdf (accessed March 2013). 
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confident assertions of the superiority of more market-oriented prescriptions may no 
longer be possible. As a World Bank report says, ‘a multi-polar world requires a new multi-
polar approach to knowledge.’24 This is just one example of how the Bank is trying to adapt 
to changing external conditions.25  
 
Perhaps the most significant process of reflection among the big DAC bilateral aid 
agencies has been seen in the UK Department for International Development (DfID), 
although here the issue has been more about the processes and practices of aid allocation. 
This has led to at least four recent notable changes. First, we have seen the ‘UK Aid: From 
the British People’ branding of activities and support. This moves away from the 
presentation of DfID as a more benevolent donor that stresses the ownership of both aid 
and projects by the recipient state. Second, we have seen a closer alignment of DfID 
priorities with the foreign policy objectives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) and potentially the Ministry of Defence with discussions over development aid 
being used for defence spending.26 Promotion of peace, stability, and containing weapons 
proliferation are among DfID’s current development priorities. This has led to what Pugh 
et al call the ‘developmentalisation of security’ that sees a shift away from interventionist 
development policies and a reorientation of agency away from the intervenor to the 
intervened. 27  Third, DfID has placed renewed emphasis on aid effectiveness that is 
performance-based and emphasises payment by results. The fourth, and perhaps most 
telling change has arisen as a result of the 2011 Bilateral and Multilateral Technical Reviews. 
The bilateral review report recommended DfID close bilateral programmes in 16 countries 
that had ‘graduated’ or where UK aid was not warranted (China and Russia are perhaps 
two of the notable countries included in this category).28 The multilateral review considered 
                                                        
24 World Bank, ‘Research for Development: A World Bank Perspective on Future Directions for 
Research’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No.5437, 2010. 
25 World Bank Annual Report 2013 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/18278949/world-bank-annual-report-
2013  
26 Tom Cargill, ‘Back to business? UK policy and African agency’ in W. Brown and S. Harman, 
eds., African Agency in International Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp65-78, Nicholas Watt, 
‘David Cameron gives green light for aid cash to go on military,’ The Guardian, 21st February 
2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/feb/21/david-cameron-aid-military (accessed 
May 2013). 
27 Jonathan Pugh, Clive Gabay, and Alison Williams, ‘Beyond the securitisation of development: 
the limits of intervention, developmentalisation of security and repositioning of purpose in the 
UK Coalition Government’s Policy Agenda,’ Geoforum 44, 2012, pp. 193-201. 
28 DfID. ‘Bilateral aid review: technical report’ (London: DfID, 2011) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214110/FIN
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the ‘value for money’ being provided by different multilateral institutions, with the 
performance of institutions being characterised as ‘Poor’ (UNIFEM), ‘Adequate’ 
(UNAIDS), ‘Good’ (UNDP), or ‘Very Good’ (GAVI).29 The result of this classification 
was an increase in funds to some institutions, e.g. UNICEF and IDA. But four 
organisations were put in ‘special measures,’30 and four organisations had their funding 
withdrawn.31 While these changes do not suggest a sustained reflection on the nature of 
‘development’ or the role of the state, they do indicate an awareness and understanding of 
the changing context of UK aid provision, both internationally and domestically. 
 
For other donors it is not clear very much is changing. The European Union, for example, 
is continuing to finance development projects in much the same way as it has since 2005 
with a ‘project approach’ to development that includes some sector and budget support. 
The emphasis within EuropeAid remains focused on the MDGs, equitable development, 
and good governance and country ownership.32 In the United States, while there is some 
evidence of a recognition of the changed external environment within which USAID 
works, the list of policy priorities articulated in the ‘Policy Framework’ produced in 2011 
reflects a fairly standard list of issues that shows a good deal of continuity with policy 
priorities of the 1990s – education, health, democracy, rights, governance, women’s 
empowerment – with the addition of several security issues – countering extremism and 
insurgency and people trafficking. 33  This indicates, perhaps, that there is less policy 
cohesion in the current period than was the case during the late 1990s, for example.34 The 
current picture then is complicated. There is something important happening in terms of 
debating development policy and some recognition that development policy needs to 
adapt to changing external circumstances. But it is also far from clear what exactly, if 
                                                        
AL_BAR_20TECHNICAL_20REPORT.pdf (accessed December 2013). The countries are: 
Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Cameroon, Cambodia, China, Gambia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, 
Lesotho, Moldova, Niger, Russia, Serbia, and Vietnam. 
29 DfID. ‘Multilateral aid review’ (London: DfID, 2011) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67583/multil
ateral_aid_review.pdf (accessed December 2013). 
30 UNESCO, FAO, Commonwealth Secretariat, and IOM 
31 UN-HABITAT,  ILO, UNIDO, and UNISDR. For further information see DfID ‘Multilateral 
aid review: taking forward the findings of the UK multilateral aid review’ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224993/MA
R-taking-forward.pdf (accessed December 2013). 
32 EuropeAid. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm (Accessed December 2013). 
33 USAID, Policy Framework, 2011-15 (Washington, DC: USAID, 2011). 
34 David Williams, International Development and Global Politics: history, theory and practice (London: 
Routledge, 2012), pp. 141-44. 
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anything, might issue from this in terms of a new kind of development consensus. 
However, and importantly, there have been some changes in patterns of development 
funding that have points of connection with some of the debates about development 
policy. We do not claim that these changes result simply from a rethinking of policy, but 
they are at least congruent with it and they certainly help to reinforce the idea that the 
project of international development is changing. 
 
Changing donor priorities: ‘big’ vs. ‘small’ development 
 
There is clear evidence of a shift in donor priorities towards infrastructure and middle-
income country investment with an emphasis on the role of the state as the driver of such 
projects. This shift stands in some tension with the development objectives exemplified 
by the MDGs. This tension has been captured by a senior World Bank staffer as the 
contrast between ‘Big Development’ and ‘Small Development.’ 35  ‘Big Development’ 
(structural transformation) requires ‘wholesale investments in roads, ports, agriculture, 
education, justice, finance and public health - and, crucially, the corresponding government 
ministries to plan, fund, implement and assess it all.’ In this vision the private sector is 
obviously important, but to function effectively it requires ‘consistent and legitimate 
institutional arrangements ensuring that the interests of elites, entrepreneurs and everyday 
citizens align.’ In short, he says, ‘Big Development seeks to build national systems.’ ‘Small 
Development’, by contrast, is ‘inspired less by transformational visions of entire countries’ 
and more by the material plight of individuals and groups. ‘Small Development’ does not 
focus on building national systems … but on compensating for the failures of systems in 
the short run.’36 These two visions of development are not necessarily incompatible, and 
in many respects it is not an either/or choice for developing countries, particularly least 
developed countries requiring the potential outcomes generated by both. But there is an 
important distinction between them and in the context of limited aid resources and 
necessary development choices the privileging of one over the other has significant 
consequences for resource allocation and the development priorities of aid recipient states. 
It seems clear that while there is still a substantial rhetorical commitment to the MDGs, in 
fact donors are increasingly channelling aid funds to ‘big development’ projects. 
                                                        
35 Michael Woolcock, ‘Duelling Development Visions: Shaping the World Bank Future’ Let’s 
Talk Development: World Bank Blog http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/what-exactly-is-
development (accessed March 2013). 
36 Woolcock, ‘Duelling Development Visions.’ 
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Launched in 2000 the purpose of the MDGs was to mobilise funds, political will and inter-
agency collaboration to address what were seen to be the eight most pressing concerns 
facing the project of development: poverty and hunger, primary education, gender equality, 
HIV/AIDS, child health, maternal health, the environment, and partnership. The MDGs 
generated a significant increase in funding to certain areas such as HIV/AIDS, and led to 
the creation of new development institutions to mobilise funds and generate public-private 
partnership such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. While some 
have argued that they represent a significant act of collective political will to alleviating 
some of the most pressing challenges of human development, more critical studies have 
demonstrated that efforts to address these goals operated largely within the paradigm of 
development thinking that prioritised the private sector as the driver of economic growth, 
and obviously had a one size fits all character.37 More importantly, perhaps, the MDGs did 
not articulate a clear development strategy (‘big development’). As Thandika Mkandawire 
argued the social protection and poverty alleviation focus of the MDGs did not add up to 
an account of the transformations associated with ‘Big Development’. 38 In this way, some 
governments felt ‘short-changed’ – they were being asked to give up on the promise of 
transformation. 
 
These debates and anxieties over the MDGs are reflected in current lack of consensus 
about what, if anything, might replace them after 2015. Some, such as Jeffery Sachs, 
propose the extension of the deadline to 2025.39 Others suggest the MDG-Plus approach: 
a reinvigoration of the current goals or a rejigging of the goals with the addition of new 
                                                        
37 David Hulme and Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Introduction: moving from the MDGs to the GDGs: 
development imperatives beyond 2015,’ in Rorden Wilkinson and David Hulme eds., The 
Millennium Development Goals and Beyond: global development after 2015 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 
pp. 1-15. For a critical account see Ashwani Saith, ‘From Universal Values to The Millennium 
Development Goals: Lost in Translation,’ Development and Change 37:6, 2006, pp. 1167-1199. For 
critical discussions of particular goals see Maxine Molyneux, ‘The Chimera of Success: gender 
ennui and the changed international policy environment’, in Andrea Cornwall, Elizabeth 
Harrison and Ann Whitehead eds., Feminisms in Development: contradictions, contestations and challenges 
(London: Zed, 2007) pp. 227-40, Sophie Harman, The World Bank and HIV/AIDS: setting a global 
agenda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), and  Peter Newell, Globalization and the Environment: capitalism, 
ecology and power, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). 
38 Thandika Mkandawire, ‘Social Sciences and the Next Development Agenda,’ Forum for 
Development Studies 35:1, 2007, p. 9. See also Charles Gore, ‘The MDG paradigm, productive 
capacities and the future of poverty reduction,’ IDS Bulletin 41:1, 2010, pp70-79. 
39 Andy Sumner and Meera Tiwari, ‘After 2015: what are the ingredients of an ‘MDG-Plus’ 
agenda for poverty reduction?’ IDS Bulletin 41:1, 2009, pp. 834-843. 
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goals.40 Popular arguments have clustered around the need to green the MDGs and to link 
the post-2015 agenda or any goals arising concretely with efforts towards sustainable 
development and addressing climate change.41 The 2008 French Sarkozy Commission on 
the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress called for a need to 
consider human wellbeing alongside more traditional development markers such as 
growth. 42  This in turn has generated a greater reflection on the role of wellbeing in 
development and how this can be incorporated into the MDG-Plus agenda.43  
 
At the same time, however, we have seen a much greater emphasis on some of the elements 
of ‘Big Development’, notably infrastructure in the classical sense of transport, public 
works, and public utilities combined with technology and communication. Infrastructure 
was a core component of development right from its origins, but from the mid-1980s its 
significance declined. The impact on indigenous people and the environment of large-scale 
infrastructure projects, particularly dams, came under increasing scrutiny as a result of 
NGO campaigns. 44  Infrastructure projects had a pretty poor record in terms of 
sustainability and development impact. The return to large-scale infrastructure based 
projects was signalled under ex-President of the World Bank Robert Zoellick’s emphasis 
on ‘modernisation’. This involved the need to be ‘client focused’ and stressed the delivery 
of ‘transformational projects.’ 45  There has also been a renewed emphasis placed on 
infrastructure by the Bank’s key shareholders, the G20, and Bank staff. 46 In 2010 the Bank 
                                                        
40 See Jan Vandemoorlele and Enrique Delamonica, ‘Taking the MDGs beyond 2015: hasten 
slowly’ IDS Bulletin 41:1, 2010, pp. 60-69, Selim Jahan, ‘The MDGs Beyond 2015,’ IDS Bulletin, 
41:1, 2010, pp. 51-59, and Myles A. Wickstead, ‘Holding on to the MDGs (for now),’ IDS Bulletin 
41:1, 2010, pp123-126. 
41 Frauke Urban, ‘The MDGs and beyond: can low carbon development be pro-poor?’ IDS 
Bulletin 41:1, 2010: pp. 92-99. 
42 Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Report by the Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 2009  http://www.stiglitz-sen-
fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf (accessed February 2013). 
43 Allister McGregor and Andy Sumner, ‘Beyond business as usual: what might 3D wellbeing 
contribute to MDG momentum?’ IDS Bulletin 41:1, 2010, pp104-112; Sumner and Tiwari, ‘After 
2015.’ 
44 Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: the World Bank, environmental impoverishment and the crisis of 
development (London: Earthscan, 1994); Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown eds., The Struggle for 
Accountability: the World Bank, NGOs, and grassroots movements, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1998).   
45  Robert Zoellick, ‘Transcript of opening press conference with World Bank Group President 
Robert Zoellick,’ 2012, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23175789~pageP
K:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed July 2012).  
46 Robert Zoellick, ‘Transcript: Development Committee Press Conference,’ 2012, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EX
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‘positioned support for infrastructure as a strategic priority in creating growth 
opportunities.’47 Bank staff claim that countries, particularly African countries, have long 
been asking for investment to support infrastructure projects.  
 
There is certainly more stress on infrastructure as measures by aid provision. Between 
2008-2011 World Bank regional lending for infrastructure projects reached US$600 million 
per year.48 A look at the aggregate figures suggests that OECD DAC aid commitments for 
energy, for example, have risen fourfold 2000-2011, while total ODA has risen by less than 
two and a half fold. Multilateral lending for energy has similarly increased four and a half 
times over the same period, with a similar increase in lending for transport and storage.49 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the data on regional lending. Total OECD DAC 
lending to Africa rose just over 20% 2007-2011, but lending for Energy rose about 50%. 
In comparison a focus on one area of human development – Health, Nutrition and 
Population – spending suggests a slight decline in health spending, and a significantly lower 
number of projects in comparison to infrastructure programmes in 2012. 50  In the 
aggregate, the World Bank Group’s infrastructure commitments increased six fold 2000-
2010. 
 
The resurgence of infrastructure spending can be attributed to many factors. The growth 
of goal-orientated strategies since 2000 has generated mixed results and importantly has 
highlighted gaps in development spending needed for their successful realisation. For 
example, development strategies to combat maternal mortality rest on effective health 
systems, working roads, medical procurement and delivery structures, information 
technology and communication, and available energy resources that make up a country’s 
infrastructure. This process of reflection and ‘learning’ takes place in a wider context. 
Three issues seem important here. First, infrastructure investment has become increasingly 
intertwined with discussions of national economic growth and job creation within developed 
states (for example, President Obama stressed the importance of infrastructure investment 




47 World Bank, Transformation through Infrastructure, (Washington: World Bank, 2012), p1. 
48 World Bank, Transformation through Infrastructure, p35. 
49 Data from OECD Qwids at: http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/ 
50 World Bank, ‘Projects and Operations: Health System Performance,’ 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&theme_exact=Health 
system performance (accessed July 2012). 
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in his 2013 State of the Union Address). Second, as noted above, infrastructure fits with 
Lin’s model of ‘new structural economics’ and an emphasis on bolder, more transformative 
projects. Finally, and crucially, the development success of China is important here, as part 
of the explanation for its success is often understood to be related to substantial 
investment in infrastructure.  
 
Changing donor landscape 
 
The total volume of development assistance has increased significantly since 2000. 
Alongside this, however, there has been a significant change in the donor landscape facing 
aid recipient states – what Woods has called a ‘silent revolution.’51 A recent ODI study 
concluded that from 2000-2009 ‘non-traditional’ aid flows increased from 8.1% of total 
flows to 30.7%.52 These ‘non-traditional’ flows include aid from non-OECD DAC states, 
climate finance funds, philanthropists and global funds. While the impact of these non-
traditional flows varies from country to country, in general their growing importance has 
created what the authors of the report call a ‘new age of choice’ for developing countries.53 
This in turn has very significant implications for relations between aid recipient states and 
‘traditional’ bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. 
 
The most significant non-OECD DAC donor is, of course China, although there are 
notable others including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Brazil and South Africa.54 For some of 
these donors, especially China, generating accurate and comparable data is difficult, partly 
because of a lack of transparency, partly because funds are provided from a variety of 
sources and partly because China does not categorise its aid according to OECD criteria.55 
According to the narrowest definition of aid (that of significantly concessional flows) 
China is a relatively small provider (about $2bn in 2010 compared to about $30bn from 
                                                        
51 Ngaire Woods, ‘Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent 
revolution in development assistance,’ International Affairs 84:6, 2008: 1205-1221.   
52 Romilly Greenhill, Annalisa Prizzon and Andrew Rogerson ‘The Age of Choice: developing 
countries in the new aid landcape,’ ODI Working Papers, Issue 364, 2013. 
53 Romilly Greenhill, ‘The Age of Choice: Cambodia in the New Aid Landscape,’ ODI Research 
Report, January 2013; Annalisa Prizzon, ‘The Age of Choice: Zambia in the New Aid Landscape,’ 
ODI Research Report, January 2013. 
54 Woods, ‘Whose aid? Whose influence?’ 
55 Deborah Brautigam, ‘Aid “with Chinese Characteristics”: Chinese Aid meets the OECD-DAC 
Regime’, Journal of International Development 23: 5, 2011, pp752-764. See also Austin Strange et al, 
‘China’s Development Finance to Africa: a media-based approach to data collection’, Centre for 
Global Development Working Paper 323, Centre for Global Development, April 2013. 
 15 
the US). However, when other flows such as export credits and natural resource back 
credits are included the figure rises significantly ($5-6bn in 2010). In addition China 
provides very significant quantities of foreign direct investment (perhaps as much as 17bn 
in 2010).56 Nearly half of all China’s foreign assistance goes to Africa, but it is not just in 
terms of aid that China has become increasing significant on the continent.57  China’s 
imports from Africa totalled nearly $120bn in 2011 and China’s exports to Africa totalled 
over $80bn.58 China is now the second largest trading partner with Africa (after the US).59 
China is also an important supplier of military equipment and training to a number of 
African states.60 China’s position as an aid donor is notable for its exception to the current 
development project rules. It is not a DAC donor, which means it does not sign up to the 
Paris Declaration commitment to partnership and country ownership of development 
programmes. Its aid also comes with few political and economic conditions attached to it 
(with the exception of asking African aid recipients to abide by the ‘one China principle’ – 
no diplomatic relations with Taiwan). 61  Importantly China prioritises infrastructure 
financing in its aid portfolio, partly in response to demands from developing countries 
themselves.  
 
Accompanying the growing aid budget of China has been that of regional development 
banks. A report by the World Bank Group Alumni – The 1818 Society – noted that despite 
an increase in investment to the Bank as a consequence of the financial crisis, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)’s increase in money was 
45% less than the regional development banks.62 The African Development Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
the Inter-American Development Bank all saw significant increases in their capital base 
                                                        
56 Brautigam, ‘Aid ‘with Chinese Characteristics’. See also Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: 
the real story of China in Africa, (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
57 Chris Alden, China in Africa: partner, competitor or hegemon? (London: Zed Books, 2007), p22. 
58 TRALAC, ‘Africa-China Trading Relationship’, Trade Law Centre, University of Stellenbosch, 
August 2014. 
59 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 
http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=4745&type=Data%20catalogue (accessed 
May 2013). 
60 Alden, China in Africa, p 25-6. 
61 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of The People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s 
Africa Policy’, January 2006. 
62 The 1818 Society, The Key Challenges Facing the World Bank President: an independent diagnostic 2012. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/1818SOCIETY/Resources/World_Bank_Diagnostic_Exerc
ise.pdf (accessed July 2012). 
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and their lending rates.63 This increase has only been over a relatively short time period, 
with the greatest increase in regional spending and lending happening from the onset of 
the financial crisis in 2007. What is notable about the increased spending power of the 
regional development banks is again the emphasis on infrastructure. Infrastructure makes 
up 38.1% of African Development Bank lending.64 Two of the top lending sectors within 
the Inter-American Development Bank portfolio are infrastructure projects on ‘Energy’ 
(17.15%) and ‘Transportation’ (14.91%), the largest portfolio is on 
‘Reform/Modernization’ which refers to public management and government 
institutions.65 The Asian Development Bank similarly shows an emphasis on infrastructure 
projects such as Energy and Transportation.66 The BRICS countries formally agreed to the 
establishment of a new development bank, a BRICS think tank council and business 
council at the BRICS Summit in Durban, South Africa, in March 2013. 67  Since this 
agreement much has been made about framing the BRICS bank as an alternative or 
challenge to the dominance of the IMF and World Bank’s lending portfolios to low and 
middle income countries and as a means of influencing reform of decision-making within 
these institutions. Though a fully functioning BRICS bank may be some time away, it 
nonetheless suggests these countries want greater influence on decision-making in 
development and that these they see the BRICS bank as a means of widening their own 
influence over the developing world. 
 
Another significant change in the development landscape is the growth of private 
philanthropy in development spending through the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(hereafter the Gates Foundation). The Gates Foundation has the largest endowment of 
any philanthropic organisation in history, has a spending portfolio on global health bigger 
that the World Health Organisation (WHO), and it finances key development agencies 
such as the Global Fund and the World Bank.68 The Foundation’s main emphasis is on 
innovation, meaning scientific discovery and technological solutions to development 
problems, and performance funding that responds to effective data. The role and impact 
                                                        
63 The 1818 Society, The Key Challenges Facing the World Bank President. 
64 AfDB, ‘Projects and Operations – Bank Group Loan and Grant Approval by Sector,’ 
http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/ (accessed February 2013). 
65 IADB, ‘Approved Projects by Sector,’  http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/projects-by-
sector,6785.html (accessed February 2013) 
66 ADB, ‘Project Records,’ http://www.adb.org/projects/search/21303 (accessed February 
2013) 
67 Fifth BRICS Summit (2013) http://www.brics5.co.za/ (accessed December 2013). 
68 Sophie Harman, Global Health Governance, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).  
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of the Gates Foundation is clear to see in global health financing and delivery;69 this is 
important as models for health financing have often been seen as models to be replicated 
in other aspects of human development, for example looking to ways in which models of 
public-private partnerships in financing strategies such as UNITAID could be used to 
mobilise funds for climate change. 70  The presence of the Gates Foundation will 
increasingly be felt with the shifting focus towards agriculture, and most significantly, as 
indicated in Bill Gates’s annual letter in 2012, the support for another green revolution, 
particularly in countries in sub-Saharan Africa.71 The significant funding capacity and scope 
of the Foundation suggests a new role for private philanthropy that is not only involved 
in technology investment but has an interest and formative role in the terms of debate in 
specific areas such as disease eradication and global health priorities for development. In 
addition, the emphasis on technology and innovation as scientific solutions to 
development problems challenges development thinking as the domain of economic 
models of growth but positions the future of the project concretely within the parameters 
of scientific discovery.  
 
The growth of non-traditional donors, the increased significance of regional development 
banks, and the re-emergence of private philanthropy through the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation all present changes in and challenges to the development landscape. Taken 
together they signal a new form of pluralism and very importantly, a dispersal of authority 
in terms of who gets to set the development agenda and who has influence over developing 
states. The significance of these changes may have less to do with the amounts of aid 
money being provided than in the way it has contributed to an on-going shift in the 
relationship between western donors and aid recipient states.  
 
Changing aid relationships 
 
At the very least the new pluralism among aid providers creates more space for developing 
counties who have some ability to pick and choose from among available donors. This 
                                                        
69 David McCoy and Linsey McGoey, ‘Global Health and the Gates Foundation – in perspective’ 
in O.D. Williams and S. Rushton, eds., Partnerships and Foundations in global health governance, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011). 
70 Sophie Harman and William Brown, ‘In from the margins? The Changing Place of Africa in 
International Relations,’ International Affairs, 89:1, 2013, pp69-87.  
71 Bill Gates, ‘Annual Letter from Bill Gates 2012,’ http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annual-
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also reduces the leverage that some of the traditional donors have over development policy 
in developing countries. There has also been some recognition that aid donors should not 
exercise the kind of leverage they attempted during the era of structural adjustment. It is 
possible to see how both of these connect up with the changes we noted above in 
development thinking about the role of the state and about policy autonomy and flexibility. 
 
China’s relations with developing countries, particularly in Africa, can be seen as an 
embodiment of a series of principles that reflect the way that China itself would like to be 
treated by western states. China’s Africa Policy, codified in 2006, says that its relations with 
Africa will be guided by four principles: sincerity, friendship and equality; mutual benefit, 
reciprocity and common prosperity; mutual support and close coordination; and learning 
from each other and seeking common development.72 In practice this has meant no explicit 
economic and political conditionality (apart from adherence to the one China policy) and 
treating African governments as legitimate representatives of the interests of their peoples. 
As a Chinese diplomat at the UN said: ‘Externally imposed conditions do not offer genuine 
solutions to African problems … The international community should … fully acquaint 
themselves with the real circumstances of the African countries, respect their sovereign 
choices and development strategies and support the continent’s efforts to lift itself up by 
its bootstraps.’73 Western states and development agencies have often been critical of 
China’s aid provision, precisely because it does not concern itself with issues such as good 
governance, corruption and human rights and lax monitoring and reporting 
requirements.74 
 
China’s increasing involvement with Africa, and the very different way it relates to 
developing countries poses a challenge to states such as the US, Britain and France who 
have historically played an important role on the continent. 75  Western donors too, 
however, have been moving to redefine their relationship with aid recipient states. By the 
mid-2000s the conditionality associated with structural adjustment lending was being 
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replaced by a new language of ‘ownership’ and partnership.76 Processes of reflection and 
learning explain part of this, as it was becoming clear that conditionality was not a very 
effective instrument for inducing and sustaining economic policy reform.77 But again this 
also reflects wider changes. Conditionality was becoming seen as increasingly illegitimate 
and the subject of vociferous criticism by NGOs and campaigning groups.78 In addition, 
as non-traditional donors became more important so western donors have become less 
and less able to exercise influence over aid recipient states. Finally, of course, the financial 
and economic crisis has undermined the legitimacy and even plausibility of some of the 
traditional policy conditions pursued by western donors. In this context the language of 
ownership has taken on a new significance. 
 
How the development of these new kinds of relationship will play out is also related to 
debates about aid provision within traditional donors, particularly in the context of 
economic austerity. Questions are being asked, for example, about why the US government 
would supply free anti-retroviral treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS in 
developing countries, but not to American citizens, or why local government budgets are 
being cut in the UK yet DfID money is being used to support strengthening local 
government in Pakistan and Jamaica. 79  Scandinavian countries such as Norway are 
reinvigorating a focus on performance indicators for aid spending, and in 2012 Germany 
and Sweden froze all funding to multilateral financing bodies such as the Global Fund. It 
may also be instructive to note that Japan’s aid programme stagnated in the second half of 
the 1990s as a result of a prolonged economic crisis.80  
 
Development in Transition? 
 
It is no doubt too early to say for sure what the full significance of these changes will be. 
It is clear, however, that something potentially very significant is happening. The project 
                                                        
76DfID, Partnerships for Poverty Reduction; changing aid ‘conditionality’ (London: DfID, 2004). 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/poverty/downloads/keyofficialdocuments/DFID%20Aid%20conditiona
lity.pdf (accessed May 2013); Tony Killick, IMF Programmes in Developing Countries: design and impact, 
(London: Routledge, 1995). 
77 DfID, Partnerships for Poverty Reduction. 
78 Vivien Collingwood, ‘Assistance with fewer strings attached’ Ethics and International Affairs, 17:1, 
2003, pp. 55-67 
79 DFID. ‘Commonwealth Local Government Good Practice Scheme’ 
https://www.gov.uk/commonwealth-local-government-good-practice-scheme (accessed April 
2013) 
80 Williams, International Development and Global Politics, pp. 129-131. 
 20 
of international development has changed in important ways over the last ten years or so. 
Development thinking is in a state of flux, but there are important signs that there is 
recognition of a renewed role for the state, particularly in low and middle income countries, 
and there now exists a plurality of financing options and sources to support state-led 
initiatives and programs. States in developing countries are beginning to gain more 
autonomy from western aid institutions because of such a plurality of aid choice and 
delivery. A combination of enhanced collective agency by aid recipient countries, and 
choice in the ideas and sources of income to finance development strategies, has afforded 
the government and civil society actors of some states the opportunity to select which 
agencies or donors they borrow money from or ‘partner’ with: OECD or non-OECD 
lenders, regional development banks or multilateral financers, private or public funds. 
While such choice is yet to be fully realized there are indications that states, particularly in 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, are savvy to these options and that institutions such as the 
World Bank are aware of the impact of such options to their lending portfolio and 
relevance. Developing countries are transitioning from the grip of ownership debates to 
become potentially more autonomous agents. 
 
The renewed role of the state is not only with regard to the management of international 
development but its delivery. Low and middle income states find much greater voice in 
regional development banks than multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and are 
articulating development strategies through south-south co-operation in, at least, 
discussions over institutions such as the BRICs bank.  Alternative sources of development 
lending and implementation of ‘big’ development come from state-owned or state-
invested corporations from China, India and Brazil. The return of the state does not mean 
an end market-based development, and none of the rethinking going on in the World Bank 
suggests that the market is not crucial for allocating some economic resources. There is, 
however, recognition that the state certainly has a more expanded role to play than that 
envisaged even in the 1990s. In addition, there are important changes in how development 
interventions are delivered and by whom, how governments articulate their own agendas, 
how state-owned and invested corporations deliver development, how south-south states 
co-operate through alternative lending sources, and the role of technology within this.  
 
Conclusion: Questions and challenges 
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There are an important set of questions and challenges that arise from this process of 
transition. Here we identify four. The first is a challenge for students of international 
development policy and practice: how do we explain why these processes of 
transformation take place? We have here only hinted at what we think are some of the 
issues involved: processes of reflection and ‘learning’ within development agencies, 
particularly the World Bank, changes in the relative power of new states, particularly China, 
economic crisis, the changing status of particular development issues, and changes within 
developing countries themselves. Each of these requires unpacking and the ways in which 
they are related to one another needs exploring to identify the economic, political and 
normative drivers of this transition.  
 
A second set of challenges face traditional aid donors and developing countries themselves. 
The ability of western aid agencies to remain central to the project of international 
development depends on their ability to adapt to the emerging pluralism, both in the wider 
donors community and in terms of development policies and practices. Debates within 
institutions such as the World Bank with regard to Lin’s new structural economics suggest 
a recognition and response to both the changing context of the project of international 
development and the need to attract lenders in a competing terrain. The challenge for 
developing countries is to use the growing autonomy some of them have, and the new 
plurality of aid donors, in ways that are developmentally beneficial. During the Cold War 
when there was also pluralism among aid donors and when some developing countries had 
significant autonomy, aid monies were quite often used in ways that did not contribute 
substantially to the process of development. No doubt with the increasing 
institutionalization of democracy there is more debate within developing countries about 
the use of aid in the present period. But it still remains the case that donor pluralism and 
autonomy cannot themselves generate successful development. 
 
A third challenge is more specific: have developing countries and aid donors learned 
lessons from past experiences with specific policies and practices? Two stand out here: 
first the stress on infrastructure and second the increased role for the state in the 
development process. This is important because as we have already noted both of these 
were emphasised in international development in the post-war period. The record from 
this period is very mixed, which is precisely why both were heavily criticised during the 
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rise of market-based solutions to the problem of development.81 Infrastructure projects 
were often badly managed and poorly implemented, some were downright wasteful, and 
the sustainability of infrastructure became a crucial issue as the fiscal situation in many 
developing countries deteriorated in the 1970s and 1980s. Government intervention in the 
allocation of economic resources has a similarly mixed record. For some states it was a 
central part of their economic success. For others it was at least implicated in economic 
mismanagement, rent-seeking and in extreme cases, full-scale economic collapse.82 Again 
it is likely that the political circumstances in many developing countries are different 
enough to expect outcomes in the present period to be different. But there is also enough 
evidence from the past to suggest that there might be important lessons to be drawn about 
the circumstances in which infrastructure investment and government intervention can be 
successful. 
 
The final set of questions relate to whether we can imagine these changes unravelling. They 
are at least partly the product of economic and political processes that are subject to 
change. An economic crisis in China or another major developing state, for example, may 
undermine the intellectual and political drivers for some of the changes we have identified. 
That said we do think the changes we have identified are related and in some ways 
reinforcing, and in this sense we can expect them to be sustained for some time. If this is 
right it may represent a significant change in the policies and practices of international 
development.  
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